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Abstract. A large chorus of voices has grown around the claim that theistic belief 
is epistemically suspect since, as some cognitive scientists have hypothesized, 
such beliefs are a byproduct of cognitive mechanisms which evolved for rather 
diff erent adaptive purposes. Th is paper begins with an overview of the pertinent 
cognitive science followed by a short discussion of some relevant epistemic 
concepts. Working from within a largely Williamsonian framework, we then 
present two diff erent ways in which this research can be formulated into an 
argument against theistic belief. We argue that neither version works.1
Belief in gods requires no special parts of the brain. Belief in gods requires 
no special mystical experiences, though it may be aided by such experiences. 
Belief in gods requires no coercion or brainwashing or special persuasive 
techniques. Rather, belief in gods arises because of the natural functioning 




Th eism is no stranger to attack. In its long and checkered history 
it has faced a barrage of tough assaults on its veracity. Some of these 
challenges, like the problem of evil, remain unresolved. Th e scientifi c 
revolution marked the beginning of a particularly diffi  cult period for 
theism, with these diffi  culties intensifi ed by modern science. Today 
1 Th anks to John Hawthorne, Michael Murray, Justin Barrett, and Alvin Plantinga 
for helpful comments on a previous draft  of this paper.
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the science vs. theism debate is an industry of its own. In recent years 
a growing number of atheists have made recourse to some of the fi ndings 
in contemporary cognitive science to formulate a novel challenge to 
theistic belief. According to several psychologists, anthropologists, 
evolutionary theorists, and cognitive scientists, the human mind evolved 
in such a way that it is naturally drawn towards belief in disembodied, 
supernatural agents, the God of monotheism being just one such agent. 
Th e belief that God exists, according to most defenders of this view, is an 
accidental byproduct of certain cognitive mechanisms that evolved for 
rather diff erent adaptive purposes. Richard Dawkins (2006: 200-22) and 
Daniel Dennett (2006), for example, make use of this research in their 
case against theism.2 Whilst neither explicitly claims that in virtue of 
this research there is something epistemically suspect about the belief 
that God exists, the innuendo is obvious. Dawkins contends that these 
fi ndings partly explain why it is that people acquire and maintain the 
delusion that God exists, whilst for Dennett this research breaks the spell 
that binds us to religious belief. 
Since no formal arguments are presented, it remains unclear how 
the research in the cognitive science of religion (CSR) can be used to 
undermine the epistemic status of the belief that God exists (hereaft er 
the CSR objection). Some, e.g., Murray (2009) and Clark and Barrett 
(2010, forthcoming) have taken up the challenge of proposing diff erent 
ways in which such arguments could be formulated to the conclusion 
that religious beliefs are irrational. Th is paper is a continuation of this 
line of work but diff ers in two respects. Firstly, we consider how the 
CSR objection might be understood in terms of Timothy Williamson’s 
knowledge-fi rst framework. Secondly, in light of the signifi cant role that 
testimony plays in the acquisition and transmission of religious belief, 
we consider the role the epistemology of testimony could play in the 
CSR objection. §2 begins with a presentation of the relevant aspects of 
the CSR research. Th ereaft er follows a brief explanation of Williamson’s 
claim that safe belief is a necessary condition for knowledge. A treatment 
of several epistemic terms of art concludes §2. In §3 we present two 
diff erent ways in which the CSR research can be formulated into an 
2 See also Atran (2002), Bering (2006, 2011), Bloom (2005), Boyer (2001), and 
Wilson (2002). 
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argument to the eff ect that the belief that God exists is unsafe. We argue 
that neither version works.
II.
2.1. Th e Cognitive Science of Religion
Owing to diff erences in methodologies and research goals, there is 
unfortunately no defi nitive statement of the cognitive and evolutionary 
psychology of religion. For our purposes it will suffi  ce to draw attention 
to the work of Justin Barrett (2004, 2009), a dominant fi gure in the CSR 
literature. Here is a rough sketch of Barrett’s theory. 
Human beings are naturally prone to develop a certain class of concepts 
that Barrett labels “minimally counterintuitive concepts” (MCIs). A MCI 
is a standard concept that has been augmented in some rather unusual 
ways such that it becomes attention-grabbing; easy to understand and 
remember; and has the capacity to feature in the explanation of many 
events. A “talking shoe” or an “invisible dog” are examples of MCIs. It is 
not unusual to fi nd disparate groups, despite having no contact with one 
another, having many MCIs in common. Th e concept of a “god” is an 
example of a common MCI, where a “god” is a disembodied, supernatural 
agent. Eventually the concept “God” developed where that term denotes 
the God of monotheism. 
Th e mental confi guration of human beings also includes an Agency 
Detecting Device (ADD) that disposes us to detect agency in our 
environment. Since ADD is sometimes triggered on the slenderest of 
bases, this so-called hypersensitive agency detection device (HADD) 
oft en registers false positives. With respect to evolutionary psychology, 
possessing such a hypersensitive device has survival advantages since 
the speedy and non-inferential detection of an agent in the vicinity 
(a predator, say, or a potential mate) would have led to greater reproductive 
success. Once the presence of an agent is registered a second mental 
tool kicks in. Th is tool, commonly termed “Th eory of Mind” (ToM), 
attributes a mental life to the detected agent, where such attributions 
typically concern what desires or intentions that agent might have vis-à-
vis the subject. 
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At a point in our history some primitive peoples perceived a state of 
aff airs that resulted in HADD triggering a belief in the presence of an 
agent. With the aid of ToM, the state of aff airs made sense in virtue of 
an agent acting in such-and-such a way with such-and-such intentions. 
However, only agents with MCI concepts of god-like agents could explain 
what they had perceived, as no natural explanation adequately accounted 
for these circumstances. As a result human beings came to believe that 
God exists. In some cases the order of explanation is in the reverse—the 
MCI “God” developed on its own apart from such inexplicable states 
of aff airs. Only much later did certain human beings retroactively 
understand said states of aff airs in terms of God’s actions. 
2.2. Knowledge as Safe Belief
Knowledge, for Williamson (2000), requires avoidance of error in similar 
enough cases. Th e basic idea is that S knows P only if S is safe from error, 
where being safe means that there must be no risk or danger that S falsely 
believes in a relevantly similar case. Knowledge, then, requires a margin 
for error; that is, cases in which S knows P must be buff ered by cases of 
true belief. Th e relevant modal notions of safety, risk, and danger are 
cashed out in terms of possible worlds such that a margin for error is 
created in so far as there is no close world in which S falls into error. Such 
worlds act as a “buff er zone” from error and thereby prevent the type of 
epistemic luck that characterizes Gettier cases.3 Here is one pertinent 
formulation of the safety condition:
If in a case α one knows p on a basis B, then in any case close to α in which 
one believes a proposition p* close to p on a basis [B*] close to B, then p* is 
true (Williamson 2009: 325).
For example, S does not know that it’s noon by looking at a broken clock 
correctly reading noon since there is a close world in which S believes 
falsely e.g. a world in which S looks at the broken clock slightly before or 
aft er noon or where the broken clock incorrectly reads 12:02. 
3 See Gettier (1963) and Shope (1983).
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Unlike the aforementioned authors, we grapple with the CSR 
objection in terms of knowledge and not in terms of rationality. Th ere are 
several reasons for this diff erence in strategy. Firstly, since those putting 
forward the CSR objection do not explicitly state that religious beliefs 
are irrational in virtue of fi ndings in cognitive science and evolutionary 
psychology, prima facie there is no reason to interpret their challenge 
in terms of rationality instead of knowledge, especially if knowledge is 
the more primitive concept of the two.4 Given the current popularity 
of explications of knowledge in terms of safe belief, Williamson’s safety 
condition is a natural choice seeing that he is one of the more infl uential 
safety theorists.5 
Secondly, most agree that knowledge is non-accidentally true belief. 
However, there is no such consensus to be found amongst those working 
on rationality. Whilst some consider rationality to be the degree to which 
evidence increases the probability of a belief ’s being true, others see it as 
a property that supervenes on the reliability of cognitive mechanisms. 
And yet others deem it to be a kind of self-refl ective state. As such some 
see rationality as being determined from an external point of view whilst 
others from an internal point of view. And the concepts of rationality 
that result from such divergent approaches can be radically diff erent. 
By concentrating on knowledge as opposed to rationality we avoid this 
murky and contested territory. 
Th irdly, given that the CSR research concerns the accidental nature 
by which theistic belief arose, one natural concern would be that theistic 
belief is accidentally true or unsafe. It would not make sense, then, to 
formulate arguments against theistic belief on the basis of the CSR research 
in terms of rationality for on most accounts of rationality an agent S may 
be rational in believing p despite S’s being lucky that p is true.
Finally, there is good reason to think that the appropriate norm 
for assertion and practical reasoning is knowledge and not justifi ed or 
rational belief (Williamson 2000: 238ff ; Hawthorne and Stanley 2008). 
Since theistic belief is oft en the subject of assertion and, more importantly, 
infl uences the way theists go about living their lives, it makes sense to 
worry about whether theists can know that God exists in light of the 
4 For arguments to the eff ect that knowledge is a primitive concept, see Williamson 
(2000: 2-5). 
5 Sosa (1999) and Pritchard (2005, 2009) are the other two infl uential safety theorists. 
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CSR research more than whether theists can rationally believe that God 
exists. 
Before commencing our treatment of the CSR objection, two 
epistemic terms of art need to be addressed. Firstly, there is a distinction 
between individual epistemology and social epistemology. Th e fi rst 
makes normative assessments of a specifi c agent’s beliefs, e.g., that an 
agent S’s belief that p is warranted or rational or justifi ed or known if 
and only if conditions C1, …, Cn are satisfi ed. Th e second diff ers in that 
normative assessments are made about an entire community’s belief(s). 
We understand the methodology of social epistemology to begin with 
an assessment of which method or cognitive process a group uses to 
produce a certain belief and then to judge the epistemic status of that 
belief, the judgment naturally applying to all agents in that community. 
An adequate treatment of the CSR objection must take into account this 
distinction for it is unclear whether CSR objectors have specifi c theists in 
mind or intend their remarks to apply to all theists. 
Secondly, knowledge is factive—only true propositions can be known. 
Without thereby begging the question, it makes little sense for the CSR 
objection to be framed on the assumption that theism is false for then 
it would be trivially true that theistic belief is unsafe. Th e CSR literature 
would then be irrelevant to the claim that theistic belief is unsafe. We 
therefore interpret the CSR objector as making the very interesting claim 
that despite it being true that God exists, God cannot be known to exist.6 
Given the conceptual dependence of assertion, practical reasoning, and 
evidence on knowledge in Williamson’s framework (ibid.: 184ff ), such 
a challenge is a serious one indeed. 
III.
As adverted to earlier, we think that the CSR objection can be formulated 
into two diff erent arguments to the conclusion that the belief that God 
exists is unsafe. An independent discussion of each objection follows.
6 Th e same point can be made with respect to interpreting the CSR objector as 
claiming that theistic belief is unjustifi ed, where justifi cation is understood as a property 
supervening on the reliability of a cognitive process. 
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3.1. Th e Counterfactual Argument
Recall that one does not know it is noon by looking at a broken clock 
that fortuitously just so happens to correctly read noon. Th at the agent 
would have falsely believed it noon even if it were not noon is one way 
of explaining why agents who look at broken clocks fortuitously reading 
the correct time are denied knowledge. On similar grounds, the CSR 
objector might have the following argument in mind: 
If God did not exist human beings would still believe that God (1) 
exists (given that humans are primed to believe in supernatural 
agents independent of whether or not such agents exist). 
Th erefore the belief that God exists is unsafe. (2) 
Th e cogency of this argument turns on the fi rst premise, which is 
expressed in the form of a counterfactual. Th ere are three reasons 
why this argument fails. Firstly, those familiar with the history of 
knowledge accounts in the post-Gettier period will recognize that the 
type of counterfactual expressed by (1) corresponds to Robert Nozick’s 
sensitivity condition for knowledge. According to Nozick (1981: 171), 
an agent S does not know p if it is the case that were p false S would still 
believe p. It is now widely recognized that the sensitivity condition for 
knowledge is inadequate in several respects.7 Th at theistic belief fails to 
satisfy the sensitivity condition for knowledge in light of evolutionary 
cognitive science is therefore irrelevant. 
Secondly, the Counterfactual Argument is invalid as it is not the case 
that if a belief fails the sensitivity condition it is therefore unsafe; that is 
to say, a failure of sensitivity does not entail a lack of safety. For example, 
in some cases sensitivity is the more stringent condition, whilst in others 
safety is. Th e following two points of logic elicit the diff erence between 
the safety and sensitivity conditions. When it comes to cases concerning 
knowledge of the denial of skeptical hypotheses the safety principle is 
less demanding than the sensitivity principle. Th e sensitivity principle 
requires that the agent not believe p in the nearest possible world in which 
7 For some reasons counting against the sensitivity condition, see Goldman (1986: 
45-6).
74 KELLY JAMES CLARK & DANI RABINOWITZ
p is false. As such no agent can know the denial of skeptical hypotheses, 
e.g., “I am not a brain in the vat,” by the simple sensitivity test because 
in the nearest possible world in which the agent is a brain in the vat the 
agent continues to believe that he is not a brain in the vat. 
Th e safety principle, however, permits knowing the denial of skeptical 
hypotheses. By the safety principle I count as knowing the everyday 
proposition p “that I have hands” only if I safely believe p. It follows, then, 
that if I safely believe p then there is no close world in which I am a brain 
in the vat and am led to falsely believe that I have hands. Consequently, 
if I know that I have hands and I know that that entails that I am not 
a brain in the vat, then I know that I am not a brain in the vat. 
On the other hand, cases can be constructed in which safety is more 
demanding than sensitivity. Suppose S truly believes p in the actual 
world but (i) in the closest world in which p is false S does not believe p, 
and (ii) there is a close world in which S falsely believes p. In this case S 
satisfi es the sensitivity condition but fails to satisfy the safety condition. 
Th e following case illustrates this point. Unbeknownst to Mary the 
thermometer she has just purchased is defective and will always yield 
a reading of 39°C regardless of her temperature. Mary, who is running 
a fever of 39°C, then uses the thermometer to measure her temperature 
and it just so happens to correctly read her temperature of 39°C. However, 
in the nearest world in which her temperature is not 39°C and she uses 
this thermometer to take her temperature, she is distracted by her son 
and she doesn’t form any belief about her temperature. She accordingly 
satisfi es the sensitivity condition for knowledge. However, there happens 
to be a non-closest close world in which Mary, who is running a fever of 
38.5°C, uses this thermometer to take her temperature and consequently 
forms the false belief that her temperature is 39°C. Mary thus fails to 
satisfy the safety condition.
In light of the complicated relationship between the sensitivity and 
safety conditions for knowledge, with respect to any belief p it is not the 
case that failure of the sensitivity condition entails failure of the safety 
condition. Th e counterfactual argument is therefore invalid. 
A third reason to discount the Counterfactual Argument is a semantic 
one. According to the standard Lewisian semantics for counterfactuals, 
a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent is vacuously true (Lewis 
1973: 24). For example, the counterfactual (3) “If frogs were numbers, 
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pigs would fl y” is true but vacuously so. As discussed earlier, we have 
interpreted the CSR objector as putting forward her objection on the 
assumption that God exists. On standard conceptions of God’s existence, 
if God exists he exists necessarily. Th at is to say, he exists in every possible 
world. Th erefore by the CSR objector’s own lights the antecedent of 
(1) is impossible. Asserting (1), therefore, amounts to no more than 
asserting (3). Th ere is thus ample reason to discredit the Counterfactual 
Argument. 
3.2. Th e Argument from Testimony Chains
Reliability, as a property of a belief-forming method, comes in diff erent 
kinds, two of which are important for the purpose at hand—local and 
global. Th e latter refers to a method M’s reliability in producing a range 
of token output beliefs in diff erent propositions P, Q, R, …, etc. A method 
M is globally reliable if and only if it produces suffi  ciently more true 
beliefs than false beliefs in a range of diff erent propositions. For example, 
M could be the visual process and P the proposition that there is a pencil 
on the desk, Q the proposition that there are clouds in the sky, and R 
the proposition that the bin is full. If a suffi  ciently high number of P, 
Q, R, … are true, then method M is globally reliable. A method M is 
locally reliable with respect to an individual target belief P if and only if 
M produces a suffi  cient ratio of more true beliefs than false beliefs in that 
very proposition P. Method M, e.g. the visual method, is locally reliable 
with respect to the belief P if and only it produces a suffi  ciently high ratio 
of true beliefs about the presence of the pencil on the desk.8
According to Williamson, for a belief to count as safe it must, amongst 
other things, be the product of a globally reliable method or basis: “If 
in a case α one knows P on a basis B, then in any case close to α in 
which one believes a proposition P* close to P on a basis close to B, P* is 
true” (Williamson 2009: 325). In light of these considerations, the CSR 
objector might have the following argument in mind:
8 At this point we remain neutral on whether reliability should be understood 
as actual reliability à la McGinn (1999) or as counterfactual reliability à la Goldman 
(2000). 
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 (3) Th e basis on which the theist believes that God exists is globally 
unreliable. 
 (4) Th erefore, the belief that God exists is unsafe. 
According to Barrett, the basis on which theistic belief arose involves the 
interaction of HADD, MCI’s, and other mental tools, ToM in particular. 
For the sake of ease, let us call this set of mental tools HADD+. On the 
simplifying assumption that these constitute a singular basis of belief, 
HADD+, so the CSR objection argues, is globally unreliable as HADD+ 
generates many false positives. Hence, the doxastic products of HADD+ 
are unsafe. Th e above argument is therefore valid and theistic belief 
unsafe. 
As discussed earlier, the distinction between individual and social 
epistemology must be kept in mind when assessing the CSR objection. It 
is unclear which theist is the target of this argument. With respect to the 
contemporary theist, it is controversial whether (i) said theists come to 
believe that God exists on the basis of HADD+, and (ii) whether HADD+ 
is globally unreliable. Concerning (i), some contemporary theists believe 
that God exists either via testimony or as the result of an argument, 
neither of which involves HADD+. With respect to (ii), even were the 
contemporary theist to believe that God exists on the basis of HADD+, 
today we use HADD+ in a fashion that is globally reliable; that is, we 
form more true than false beliefs about agents in our environments. So 
the above argument is irrelevant to most contemporary theists. 
Suppose, however, we concede the truth of (3) for the very earliest 
theists because they were using HADD+ in ways that generated many 
false positives; that is to say, for these very early theists their HADD+ 
may have been globally unreliable. Th erefore, with respect to these very 
early theists the belief that God exists was unsafe. Given this supposition, 
the CSR objector might have the following argument in mind:
 (5) On the basis of HADD+ some primordial human beings came 
to believe that God exists.
 (6) In these primordial human beings HADD+ was a globally 
unreliable basis for belief.
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 (7) Beliefs produced by globally unreliable methods do not 
constitute knowledge.
 (8) Th erefore, these primordial human beings did not know that 
God exists.
 (9) Contemporary theists believe that God exists via testimony 
chains originating with these primordial human beings.
 (10) A testimony chain that does not begin with knowledge cannot 
yield knowledge to the recipient at the termination of that 
testimony chain.
 (11) Th erefore, contemporary theists don’t know that God exists via 
such testimony chains. 
Th e Argument from Testimony Chains seeks to undermine the epistemic 
status of theistic belief by identifying its epistemically suspect causal origins. 
It goes without saying that the causal origin of a belief p can be important 
to the epistemic status of p. For instance, I cannot know q if I believe q on 
the basis of an inference from p, and where I do not know p.9 
As has been conceded, (5)—(8) may indeed be true. And given that 
many contemporary theists believe that God exists via testimony, (9) 
may be true as well. (10), however, is false. An agent S2 can safely believe 
a true proposition p via testimony from an agent S1 even if S1 does not 
safely believe p. Consider the following case from Lackey (2008: 48). It 
is plausible that a child knows that modern-day homo sapiens evolved 
from homo erectus when taught so by her teacher, even though her teacher 
is a religious fundamentalist who does not believe that evolution is true. 
In this case the child’s belief is safe despite the teacher not believing that 
modern-day homo sapiens evolved from homo erectus and therefore not 
knowing as much (on the assumption that knowledge entails belief). 
Testimony can thus be an epistemically generative process—it may 
permit the hearer to gain something the speaker lacks. 
So much for testimony from one person to another. But what about 
testimony chains? Might a testimony chain that originates with a person 
who does not safely believe p prevent the person at the termination of 
the chain from knowing p? An extrapolation of the foregoing case proves 
9 See Goldman (1986: 52) for a further case demonstrating the importance of 
a diachronic approach to epistemic status. 
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that safe belief is possible for an agent at the termination of such a chain. 
Suppose Billy, one of the children in the biology class, tells his best friend 
Jack that modern-day homo sapiens evolved from homo erectus (and would 
not have easily deceived Jack in this case). We take it that Jack also counts 
as safely believing that modern-day homo sapiens evolved from homo 
erectus. And so on. And surely the contemporary theist, relying on the 
testimony of her parents or community, counts as knowing that God 
exists even if that testimony chain originated in a primordial ancestor 
who did not know that God exists. With respect to the contemporary 
theist, at least, the Argument from Testimony Chains is unsound.10
In light of these considerations, the CSR objector may concede that 
whilst (10) is not a universally true principle, there are cases in which it 
does hold and that the genesis of theistic belief according to CSR is just 
such a case. For example, if I truly believe that the train is about to depart 
on the basis of testimony from someone who read a departure schedule 
riddled with mistakes, it seems that my belief does not count as safe. 
Th e contemporary theist is in a similar position, so the CSR objector 
might argue, if she believes that God exists based on a testimony chain 
originating in an ancestor who came to believe that God exists on the 
basis of a globally unreliable method. 
Th ere is room to argue, however, that exceptionally long testimony 
chains with unsafe origins exhibit some unique epistemic features. 
We argue that a case can be made for there being a sense in which the 
primordial human (S1) is a reliable testifi er and as such the contemporary 
theist (SN) can safely believe that God exists from a testimony chain 
originating with S1 even if S1 used the globally unreliable HADD+ to 
arrive at theistic belief. For the sake of argument consider a case in which 
S1 holds a set of beliefs {P, Q, R, …} and that many of these beliefs are 
generated by HADD+. S1 testifi es to others a great many of the beliefs she 
holds overall. Let us stipulate further that P is the belief that God exists 
and is one of the few true beliefs in the set {P, Q, R, …}. S1 is thus an 
unreliable testifi er (as the CSR objector contends). Assume further, and 
10 We are aware that this is not an uncontentious claim to make as many episte-
mologists require the speaker to know p, amongst other things, in order for the hearer 
to know p, e.g. Burge (1993), Plantinga (1993: 86), and Nozick (1981: 187). But the pri-
ma facie plausibility that Billy knows that modern-day homo sapiens evolved from homo 
erectus brings into question the veracity of the traditional view.
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not unreasonably, that as time passes humans develop mentally. As they 
do, the testimony chains passing along beliefs Q, R, and the other false 
beliefs in the set “die out” or “dry up” because people come to realize that 
Q, R, etc. are false. We call this feature of long testimony chains epistemic 
winnowing; individuals and communities do not generally pass along 
information they deem false. And epistemic winnowing is something we 
expect others in our community to be committed to.11 By the time SN 
receives the testimony that P from a testimony chain originating with S1, 
there are no false beliefs from S1’s mouth that are passed along anymore; 
if so, from SN’s perspective, at least, S1 is a reliable testifi er. 
One can explain this conclusion in terms of safety: there is no close 
world in which SN falsely believes P or any other relevantly similar belief 
by way of a testimony chain originating with S1. It seems reasonable 
to us that the contemporary theist who believes by way of such a long 
testimony chain is the benefi ciary of epistemic winnowing. Th erefore, 
even if the testimony chain by which a contemporary theist believes 
that God exists has an unsafe genesis, the belief held thereby is safe. Th e 
Argument from Testimony Chains is thus unsuccessful.
Additionally, it is doubtful that many contemporary theists believe 
that God exists on the basis of an extremely long testimony chain 
that originates in an unreliable theistic ancestor. It is more likely that 
a considerable number of contemporary theists believe on the basis of 
a religious experience. Given that for most of us HADD+ is globally 
reliable, it stands to reason that were HADD+ the basis on which theistic 
belief is formed as a result of these religious experiences, such theistic 
belief would be safe.
IV.
We have presented two diff erent ways in which the cognitive science of 
religion might be used to generate an argument towards the conclusion 
that the belief that God exists is unsafe. For a number of diverse reasons 
each argument fails. Th is failure does not entail that belief in God is safe, 
however. Th at would require a separate consideration of its own. 
11 For the role of one’s community in the epistemology of testimony, see Goldberg 
(2010).
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